

STRATEGIC EUROSCEPTICS, POLITE XENOPHOBES OR ANGRY MEN?

**Support for the UK Independence Party (UKIP) in the 2009 European
Parliament Elections**

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Abstract. Britain has long been identified with a strong tradition of Euroscepticism, yet we know little about the drivers of support for openly Eurosceptic parties. In this article, we draw on a unique large-scale dataset to undertake the first ever individual-level analysis of the social and attitudinal drivers of support for the UK Independence Party (UKIP) in the 2009 elections to the European Parliament. We find that while Euroscepticism is the most important driver of UKIP support, it is not the whole story. Other attitudinal drivers, namely political dissatisfaction and xenophobia, are also important. Examining vote-switching between first and second order elections, we also find evidence of a distinction between two types of supporter: more affluent middle class ‘strategic defectors’ from the mainstream Conservative Party who support UKIP to register their Euroscepticism; on the other are more economically marginal and politically disaffected ‘core loyalists’ who are attracted to UKIP by its xenophobic, increasingly Islamophobic and populist anti-establishment strategy. Our analysis suggests that UKIP is well positioned to recruit a more stable and enduring base of support from its extreme right-wing competitor and become a significant vehicle of xenophobia and, more specifically, Islamophobia in modern Britain.

Introduction

Britain has long been associated with a strong tradition of Euroscepticism. The dynamics of this particular tradition in British politics have been the subject of numerous academic studies which trace its roots and evolution (Baker et al. 1998; Forster 2002; George 2000; Spiering 2004), seek to account for its presence (Aspinwall 2000; Gifford 2006) and investigate its manifestation and impact in the arena of party politics (e.g. Evans 1998, 1999). Despite this strong interest, however, we still know little about who actually turns out to support explicitly Eurosceptic parties in second order elections and why. In recent years, this gap has been brought into sharper focus by the electoral performance of the UK Independence Party (UKIP) which was founded in 1993 by members of the Anti-Federalist League who were opposed to the Maastricht Treaty. Consistent with second order election theory, since their formation UKIP have polled stronger in second-order elections to the European Parliament (EP) than first-order general elections. UKIP's share of the vote in EP elections has increased markedly, rising from 1 per cent in 1994 to 16 per cent in 2004. In elections to the European Parliament in 2009, UKIP polled 2.5 million votes (16.5 per cent) and elected 13 candidates. In fact, UKIP finished in second place above the incumbent Labour government and behind the opposition mainstream Conservative Party.

UKIP has received some attention in studies based on aggregate voting patterns (Borisjuk et al. 2007; Curtice, Fisher & Steed 2005; John & Margetts 2009) and party organization (Abedi & Lundberg 2009; Hayton 2010; Sutcliffe 2010; Usherwood 2008)¹, but the social and attitudinal drivers of support for this latest manifestation of organized Euroscepticism remain poorly understood. This lack of

research is puzzling given the burgeoning literatures on British Euroscepticism, party-based Euroscepticism (e.g. Taggart 1998; Taggart & Szczepiak 2008) and second order election theory more broadly (see Marsh & Mikhaylov 2008 for a useful review). Given this interest, the absence of systematic research on UKIP support is primarily the consequence of a dearth of reliable data on minor party voters which renders individual level analysis difficult. The post-election British Election Study (BES) in 2005 included just 45 UKIP supporters (Borisyuk et al., 2007: 670), while an earlier study of the explicitly Eurosceptic Referendum Party (RP) was based on a sample of 34 respondents (Heath et al. 1998). Systematic investigation of minor party voters, however, is not impossible, as demonstrated in a series of innovative individual and aggregate-level studies focused on another minor party in British politics, the extreme right-wing British National Party (BNP; Bowyer, 2008; Cutts, Ford & Goodwin 2010; Eatwell & Goodwin 2010; Ford & Goodwin, 2010; Goodwin 2010).

In fact, some aggregate research provides evidence of high correlations between support for the extreme right BNP and UKIP, suggesting that both parties are recruiting support from the same social groups (Borisyuk et al. 2007; Cruddas et al. 2005; John and Margetts 2009). As John and Margetts (2009: 501) observe, the BNP and UKIP adopt similar discourse on issues of immigration and national identity and thus the media and public often perceive both parties to be ‘part of the same phenomenon’.² Drawing on aggregate data, they observe that ‘the right-wing UKIP draws upon the same source of social and political attitudes among the public as the BNP and has the potential to convert such attitudes into votes’ (Ibid, p.508). This tentative evidence is not all that surprising when we consider the wider observation that one feature of ‘opposition Euroscepticism’ is that it brings together “strange

bedfellows” of some very different ideologies. As Szczerbiak and Taggart (2000:5) observe, Euroscepticism extends from ‘new politics, old far left politics through regionalism to new populism and neo-fascism’.

In this study, we employ a unique large scale dataset of UKIP supporters surveyed before the 2009 European Parliament elections to provide new insights into the social and attitudinal profile of the party’s supporters. Our aims are three-fold; first, we examine the socio-demographic profile of UKIP support; second, we examine the attitudes and policy-based concerns which motivate the party’s supporters; and third, we investigate the distinction between ‘core’ UKIP supporters who remain loyal to their vote choice in both second-order and first-order elections, and ‘strategic’ UKIP supporters who only make this choice in the context of a second-order contest.

We find that UKIP support is concentrated among older, financially insecure men with a Conservative background. UKIP support is significantly higher among the skilled working classes, who have been perhaps most exposed to competition from the European Common Market, and is also much higher among those who read Britain’s Eurosceptic right wing tabloid newspapers. Attitudinally, Euroscepticism is the main driver of UKIP support, as might be expected, but it is not the sole motive correlated with support for the party. UKIP voters also show significantly higher levels of hostility to immigration and disaffection with the mainstream political elite, suggesting some voters are indeed using UKIP as a vehicle for expressing their discontent with the domestic political situation. We also find that “strategic” UKIP voters are very distinct from “core” supporter – the former appear principally to be Conservative voters registering their hostility to the EU while the latter are a poorer, more working class, and more deeply discontented group, resembling the support base

of the BNP and of many European populist right-wing parties. UKIP's credentials as a legitimate party of right wing protest may make it a 'polite alternative' for voters angry about rising immigration levels but repelled by the extremist image and fascist history of the more radical British National Party.

Insert Table 1 about here

Why vote UKIP? Theory and hypotheses

Given the absence of research on the UKIP vote, one useful theoretical starting point is the older socio-structural model of voting behaviour which underscores the influence of background characteristics. As noted above, it has been suggested that UKIP and the BNP mobilize support from similar social groups. Studies of the BNP vote reveal that support for the extreme right is concentrated heavily among older working class males who are pessimistic over future economic prospects and tend to reside in England's industrial north, Midlands and outer-east London (Cutts, Ford & Goodwin 2010; Ford & Goodwin 2010; also Goodwin 2010). This leads us to the hypothesis that UKIP similarly recruits support from such discontented social groups who occupy a more precarious position in society and who, in turn, are more exposed to economic competition from Europe and from the recent waves of migration that have followed the EU accession of states like Poland and Romania in 2004 and 2007. Hostility to the EU "project" may also be higher amongst older cohorts of voters, who grew up before Britain joined the EEC and recall the intense debates about the merits

of joining, than among younger generations who may accept the EU as a normal part of the political infrastructure. Britain also has an unusually Eurosceptic media, with many papers adopting a stridently anti-EU position and writing regular lead articles about the perceived corruption and failings of politics in Brussels and Strasbourg. Regular readers of such papers may well adopt a more hostile view of the EU. We therefore expect support for UKIP to be concentrated among those who believe EU membership brings material threats, or those whose perception of the EU is overwhelmingly negative: older generations who grew up before the onset of European integration, working class men who are most likely to perceive that resources are under threat from free trade competition and new migrant groups, those who feel more economically insecure and those who read tabloid newspapers which often adopt hostile positions toward the EU.

Social background, however, provides only a partial explanation of voting behaviour. This is especially the case in less salient second-order elections, such as those for the European Parliament, when voters may depart from their habitual political loyalties (Reif & Schmitt, 1980). Academic interest in second-order voting behaviour has recently reignited, with a series of individual-level analyses of voters' choices in European elections (e.g. Schmitt et al. 2008; Hobolt & Wittrock 2009). Three quite distinct hypotheses emerge from this literature. First, voting behaviour may be driven by more strategic – or insincere – considerations, not least because ‘the vote in European Parliament elections does not result in any process of government formation, voters are less concerned with the strategic outcomes of their vote’ (Marsh & Mikhaylov 2008: 9). In particular, citizens may use second order elections in an instrumental manner to register their dissatisfaction with the performance of the incumbent national government or main party of choice (e.g. Heath et al. 1999;

Oppenhuis, van der Eijk & Franklin 1996). Rather than express sincere support for UKIP and their policies, citizens may see the party as a credible anti-establishment challenger which they can use to register their protest or dissatisfaction over issues and events in the domestic arena. In this study, our data was gathered in the immediate aftermath of a wide ranging scandal over abuse of expenses by legislators in the House of Commons. The domestic situation at the time of a second-order contest is important (Reif 1985: 8-9), and so we might expect this specific event to heighten political dissatisfaction. Indeed, during the campaign UKIP sought to recruit protest voters by portraying itself as the 'real opposition' and urging voters to 'sod the lot'.³ Once controlling for their background characteristics, this leads us to the hypothesis that UKIP may derive support from those dissatisfied with established mainstream parties.

A second alternative hypothesis, however, posits that the decision to vote for a challenger party like UKIP may be driven by more sincere and expressive preferences for policies offered by this party. As elsewhere, voters in Britain consider second order elections to be less consequential (e.g. Heath et al. 1999), and so they might take the opportunity to endorse or express ideological affinity with smaller and more ideologically extreme minor parties. In contrast, such parties tend to suffer in first order Westminster first-past-the-post elections which severely penalise small parties without a geographically concentrated base of support, such as UKIP (Duverger 1954).

These sincere voting decisions could manifest in two forms. On the one hand, UKIP supporters may be driven foremost by their preferences over the party's core issue of Europe, an issue which others have shown is relevant to voting in EP contests more generally (e.g. Hobolt, Spoon & Tilley 2009; Rohrschneider & Clark 2008; van

der Brug et al. 2007). This leads us to the expectation that the party will be a bastion of strident Eurosceptics who express little concern or even interest in other issues. Clearly, it will not be surprising if Euroscepticism is a major driver of support for UKIP, a party whose most salient policy is complete withdrawal from the EU. As other comparative research has shown, the division between elites' enthusiasm about the EU and electorates who are more sceptical about it has been an important driver behind the emergence of a range of Eurosceptic parties (Hobolt et al. 2009). What is unclear, however, is the *extent* to which Euroscepticism is the dominant – or even only – driver of support for UKIP and whether, once we control for this motive, other factors make no significant contribution to the UKIP vote.

On the other hand, however, sincere voting could manifest in a different form whereby citizens use second order elections to register their concerns over domestic political issues that are not currently being addressed by the mainstream parties. Rather than driven solely by Euroscepticism, the UKIP vote may be motivationally diverse and the product of supporters who are concerned over a range of alternative (mainly right-wing) issues on which the party also campaigns, such as crime, law and order and immigration. From 2001 onward, UKIP has sought to mobilize a broader coalition of voters by advocating, for example, stricter sentencing for criminals, constructing more prisons, reducing council tax, greater use of referenda to resolve issues and devolving greater powers to county and borough councils (UKIP 2010). In particular, however, UKIP have put much stronger programmatic and campaigning emphasis on their opposition to immigration and Islam. In recent years, UKIP leaders have invited the populist right-wing Dutch politician Geert Wilders to present a radical attack on Islam in the House of Lords (by showing his film *Fitna*), and the party has called for a ban on the wearing of face-covering veils in public places. Such

initiatives appear designed to mobilize voters who feel threatened by immigration and growing Muslim communities, both of which have been highly salient issues in recent electoral cycles, and important drivers of the rise in support for the extreme right British National Party (Goodwin 2010; McLaren & Johnson 2007; Voas and Ling 2010).

This embrace of anti-immigrant and Islamophobic frames has led one commentator to criticize UKIP as being the ‘BNP in blazers’ and claim that despite the party’s attempts to present a moderate image their social bases of support are comprised mainly of ‘angry old men’.⁴ It may be that UKIP – a party which has attracted significant numbers of senior Conservatives and enjoys access to media and mainstream political allies – is recruiting support from citizens who view the party as a ‘polite alternative’ to the right-wing extremist BNP which is regarded by most British voters as illegitimate due to its associations with violence, biological racism and anti-Semitism. This leads us to the hypotheses that xenophobia and racism may also be important motives driving support for UKIP.

One final question centres on the lesser-studied phenomenon of vote-switching, and whether there is a distinction between ‘core’ and ‘strategic’ supporters. By strategic supporters we mean citizens who vote UKIP in the context of a second-order election but who make a different vote choice in a first order election. By core supporters we mean citizens who vote UKIP in both second order and first order elections. Second order election theory leads us to expect that the background and motivations of these two types of supporters will be quite different. Citizens may use second order contests to ‘send a message’ to the incumbent national government over domestic policy issues, but may return to their traditional allegiances in first order general elections where there is more at stake. This distinction appears especially

salient in the UK, where the majoritarian electoral system discourages support for minor parties which have scant prospects of securing legislative representation in Westminster. On the other hand, core voters who retain this vote choice in national elections are either likely to have a much stronger attachment to the party in question and its policies, or be so hostile to the mainstream parties that they are only willing to vote for minor parties with no chance of winning. We hypothesise that ‘core’ UKIP supporters who back the party in first order and second order elections will be more intensely concerned about the party’s core issue of Europe, and will be more hostile to the mainstream political parties than ‘strategic’ supporters who back the party in second order European elections but return to the mainstream at Westminster polls.

Data and Methods

We use survey data gathered from the YouGov online panel over the week prior to the European Parliament election. Scholarly comparisons of opt-in internet panels with traditional stratified random sample interview and random digit dial techniques have concluded that the biases introduced by this methodology are small, and are more than offset by the much larger sample sizes the internet based methodology permits (Sanders et al. 2006). This nationally representative panel only contains adults who were eligible to vote at the time of the election.⁵ The data are weighted to the profile of eligible voters in the United Kingdom on the basis of age, gender, social class, region, party identity, newspaper readership and people without internet access. Targets for the weighted data were derived from the 2001 census, a national readership survey, made up from 34,000 random face to face interviews conducted

annually, and YouGov estimates of party identity. After asking each respondent their voting intention the survey produced a total of 4,306 self-identified supporters of UKIP, 15 per cent of the total sample.⁶

We commence by comparing the background and attitudes of UKIP supporters with those of other parties using simple bivariate analysis. After this, we progress to a series of multivariate models to test our hypotheses about the background and motivations predicting UKIP support. Our dependent variable in these models is vote intention, with UKIP voters coded 1 and all other voters coded 0. We employed factor analysis to aggregate groups of questions on the YouGov sample which touch upon the same core issues – specifically Euroscepticism, xenophobic hostility to immigration, populist hostility to the mainstream political parties and racial prejudice. Full details of this factor analysis and the wording of questions included in each factor are provided in the appendix. The factor analysis confirmed that each set of questions loaded on a single factor, and pair wise correlations between the factors suggested that they are weakly related, with correlations of 0.2-0.4, except for racial prejudice and xenophobia which correlate at 0.7. To guard against the possibility that results are influenced by collinearity between these last two factors, we present results from separate models with and without racism.⁷ Predicted factor scores for each factor are employed as measures for these concepts in our regression models. These scores are standardised with a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one to allow comparison of the factor effects.

The use of multiple item factors lead to one complication: the level of missing data in the final factors was quite high, perhaps as a result of the sensitive nature of some questions touching on racial attitudes and views of immigrants. In our initial analysis, cases with any missing data were deleted from the model. This resulted in a

very high level of data loss, with over 40 per cent of cases excluded from the final models. This introduced a substantial risk of bias in the final models. To reduce the level of missing data, we imputed the missing values on each attitudinal factor using a multiple imputation procedure (Rubin 1987; 1996).⁸ This generates multiple estimates of the missing values using a multivariate normal regression implemented using an iterated Markov-chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) process. Twenty completed datasets are generated. Analysis is carried out on each and then pooled into a single set of estimates which incorporate the cases missing data on some variables while properly accounting for the added uncertainty introduced by the missing data.

Other issues such as attitudes to homosexuals, or views of the mainstream political parties, are tapped by single survey items. After specifying a fully elaborated model of UKIP support, we use predicted probabilities to illustrate the substantive importance of the different factors which are significantly correlated with UKIP support. Finally, we specify a further logistic regression model to test which factors separate the ‘core’ UKIP voters who intend to support the party in national elections from the ‘strategic’ supporters who only intend to vote for the party in second order European contests.

Who Votes UKIP?

Table 2 presents a comparison of the socio-economic and political characteristics of UKIP supporters with those of the three mainstream parties, the BNP and also non-voters. UKIP supporters are predominantly male (only the extreme right BNP are more male-dominated) and also come from older age groups. UKIP support is

concentrated strongly among older age groups, especially citizens aged 60 and above while it is weakest among those aged 18-29. This may be a generational effect at work, with British citizens who were socialized prior to the Maastricht Treaty and the acceleration of European integration more likely to perceive EU membership as being of limited benefit and favour withdrawal. The regional distribution of UKIP support also meets our expectations: support is stronger in the relatively prosperous regions of England – the Midlands and South – which have not benefited from EU structural funds. In contrast, UKIP is weaker in the more economically deprived northern region of England and also London which has by far the most cosmopolitan population in Britain. UKIP support is also much weaker in Scotland and Wales, where the party faces competition from nationalists focussing discontent on England and Westminster, and where the local electorate may therefore regard the EU as a valuable counterbalance to English political dominance. The distribution of UKIP support is quite different to the extreme right BNP and Labour, both of which are strongest in the more industrial north, and is most similar to the Conservatives who are strongest in the South but weak in the north and Celtic fringe.

The social class distribution of UKIP support closely matches that of the sample as a whole. Only one group – skilled manual workers – are over-represented. This fits with our hypothesis that anxiety over economic competition may drive support for UKIP - British manufacturing has struggled to cope with competition from European trading partners since EU accession, and skilled workers have also faced more recent competition from Central European migrants willing to work for lower wages. There is also evidence that personal economic insecurity is related to UKIP support. Anxieties about unemployment, living standards and future earning are all more common among UKIP supporters. We also find evidence to support the

hypothesis that UKIP draws support particularly from disaffected Conservatives: UKIP supporters are more likely to claim that their parents voted Conservative. Again, this differentiates the party from the BNP, whose supporters are drawn more from Labour backgrounds (Goodwin 2010).

Insert Table 2

Table 3 compares the attitudinal profile of UKIP supporters with those of supporters of other parties and allows us to make three observations. First, UKIP supporters are clearly distinguishable from supporters of other parties by their intense levels of Euroscepticism: these supporters are the most strongly Eurosceptic on each of the items. Second, on issues of immigration and racism UKIP fall between the extreme right BNP – who are the most racist and xenophobic – and the centre right Conservatives, who are the most hostile of the three mainstream parties. This provides some evidence to the popular claim that UKIP supporters are, like supporters of the BNP, hostile to ethnic minorities and angry about immigration although they express these intolerant sentiments less intensely than BNP supporters. Third, we also find evidence of considerable hostility among UKIP supporters toward mainstream political parties. UKIP supporters are much more likely to regard politicians as corrupt, to distrust their MPs and perceive no difference between the main parties. UKIP supporters are also more disaffected with the main parties – they are more likely to say that both Labour and the Tories used to care about people like them, but no longer do. Once again, they share this characteristic with the BNP, although supporters of UKIP are characterized by slightly lower levels of political dissatisfaction.

Insert Table 3

Multivariate analysis

Table 4 presents results from a series of logistic regression analyses of UKIP support. The first model introduces demographic predictors. We find that UKIP support is significantly higher among men, those living in the Midlands and the South of England and the economically insecure. Support is significantly weaker in Wales and particularly in Scotland, suggesting UKIP has limited appeal in the Celtic nations where the alien political power of greatest concern is not Strasbourg but Westminster. Social class remains a poor predictor of UKIP support, but all forms of economic insecurity are associated with elevated support for the party. In contrast to extreme right supporters who are more likely to come from Labour family backgrounds, UKIP supporters are significantly more likely to come from Conservative family backgrounds, suggesting the ideological orientation of the party is most attractive to disillusioned former Conservatives. Those who read right-wing tabloid newspapers, which have run prominent anti-immigrant and Eurosceptic campaigns, are also more likely to support the party.

Insert Table 4

Model 2 introduces Euroscepticism, to test the hypothesis that UKIP support is driven solely by opposition to the EU. Euroscepticism is clearly a very strong driver of UKIP support – the model F-statistic increases dramatically when it is included.⁹ Some of

the predictors of UKIP support are greatly reduced or rendered insignificant when it is added. The higher rates of UKIP support among older voters, skilled manual workers, those with Conservative families and those who read anti-immigrant tabloid papers looks to be largely a consequence of higher Euroscepticism. After controlling for Euroscepticism, support among the unskilled manual classes is significantly lower than in other economic groups. However, other demographic predictors remain significant in the new model: the greater support for UKIP among the financially insecure and those in the Midlands and the South cannot be explained by higher Euroscepticism alone, while lower support for UKIP in Scotland is not the result of greater enthusiasm for the EU among the Scots. In short, while Euroscepticism is clearly the most important driver of UKIP support, it is not the whole story.

This becomes even clearer in Model 3 when we introduce the other attitudinal variables. Both xenophobia and populism are significantly correlated with UKIP support, although the impact of these motivations (as shown by the standardised coefficients) is roughly one tenth that of Euroscepticism. Voters hostile to the British political elite, or towards new migrants to Britain, clearly regard UKIP as a legitimate outlet for expressing their concerns. There is also evidence that political alienation from the 'big two' parties are driving UKIP support. UKIP voters are much more likely to believe that Labour and the Conservatives used to care about people like them, but do no longer. UKIP voters are also more likely to say that Labour never cared about them, perhaps reflecting the stronger roots of UKIP in the Conservative support base, which feels similarly about the Labour party.

In the final model we introduce measures of racial prejudice, which are considered separately due to possible collinearity with the xenophobia measure. The majority of coefficients in the new model are unchanged. Xenophobia becomes more

strongly related to UKIP support, while racism shows a significant negative correlation. This suggests that UKIP are particularly successful at attracting voters from citizens who are alarmed about immigration and hostile to immigrants, but who are not (or at least not openly) hostile to British ethnic minorities. The measure of Islamophobia is not significantly associated with UKIP support while belief in a Jewish conspiracy is negatively correlated with support for the party, confirming that not all forms of intolerance are currently associated with UKIP support. Those who agree with open statements of hostility towards ethnic minorities, Muslims and Jews are perhaps more likely to vote for the more openly intolerant BNP.

The substantive importance of the different factors which our models suggest drive support for UKIP is illustrated in Figure 1, which shows the increase in support for UKIP generated by changing different predictors, while holding other predictors constant at their means (continuous variables) or at a reference value (categorical or nominal variables). Variables found to be insignificant in previous models are dropped in this prediction model, to provide a more parsimonious model and more accurate estimates of effects by removing possible sources of collinearity.¹⁰

In summary then, Euroscepticism was clearly the most important driver of support for UKIP in the 2009 European elections. The estimated effect of 2 s.d. change in Euroscepticism was much larger than any other effect. However, Euroscepticism is not the whole story. We find that other factors also had an important effect on UKIP support. Regional differences in support amount to over four percentage points, while disillusionment with Labour raised UKIP support by a similar amount. The other attitudinal factors have lower effects, but still raise support for UKIP by between one and two percentage points.

Core loyalists versus strategic defectors

UKIP's popularity in European Parliament elections has not been mirrored at recent general elections: while the party has secured 2.5 million votes in both of the last two EP elections, its Westminster vote remains below 1 million. Minor parties' face a much tougher battle under the first-past-the-post system to get local candidates elected, and are therefore often seen as a wasted vote. A lack of media attention, limited party funds and a weak activist base may also have played a part in UKIP's inability to make a general election breakthrough. But the most important explanation may lie in the saliency of the European issue. As the previous analysis has shown, UKIP support is driven primarily, though not exclusively, by Euroscepticism. Europe is obviously a central issue in European Parliament elections, but is much less salient in domestic elections to the Westminster Parliament. Many UKIP voters may therefore direct their support elsewhere in domestic elections where Europe is a much less important factor in their decision.

Some circumstantial evidence of this is revealed in the YouGov sample. When asked 'how would you vote in a general election tomorrow', only 40.1 per cent of UKIP supporters who voted for the party in the European election stated that they would also vote UKIP in a first order general election. The Conservatives were by far the most popular alternative for UKIP voters in domestic elections, with 37.1 per cent of UKIP voters claiming they would support the Conservatives in Westminster elections.¹¹ This reveals how the UKIP electorate is comprised of two parts: a smaller core of voters who support UKIP in all elections (the 'core loyalists') and a larger

periphery who vote UKIP only in second order European elections, the majority of whom vote Conservative in general elections (the ‘strategic defectors’).¹²

At the outset, we hypothesized that core UKIP loyalists may be more concerned about the party’s core issue of Europe and more disaffected with the mainstream political parties than strategic defectors. In contrast, the latter may be voters who retain links to mainstream parties but are motivated to defect in EP elections by an instrumental desire to register their opposition to the EU. In Table 5 we test this hypothesis by replicating the logistic regression analyses conducted in Table 4 to examine predictors of loyalty to UKIP in general elections among the total sample of European Parliament UKIP voters. Table 5 presents a series of three logistic regression models examining the probability that a UKIP supporter in the European Parliament elections will also say they intend to support the party in the coming general election. The models replicate those presented in Table 4, but the racism model is dropped as it has no significant effect in this case.

The results suggest that the two types of UKIP voters are quite distinct, both in terms of demographics and attitudes. Demographically, core loyalists are more likely to be young, female, working class and struggling financially while those who intend to change their vote tend to be affluent middle class males. These core supporters of UKIP are also much more likely to report having grown up in Labour households than strategic defectors, and the party shows a higher concentration of core support in Wales, a traditionally Labour voting part of Britain. We find no evidence that more intense Euroscepticism produces greater loyalty to UKIP: core loyalists and strategic defectors show similar levels of opposition to the EU. The distinctive motivations of UKIP loyalists are instead on the issues of populism and xenophobia. Core supporters are much more dissatisfied with the mainstream political elite than strategic defectors

who intend to switch allegiance to another party, and are also more hostile to immigrants. These two types of supporters are also distinguishable by their attitudes toward the two main parties: core loyalists are hostile to the Conservative Party, regarding it as a party that either has never represented their interests or has ceased to do so, while strategic defectors have quite positive views of the Conservatives. By contrast, UKIP loyalists have more positive feelings towards Labour than strategic defectors – they are less likely to regard Labour as a party that has ‘never cared about people like me’.

In summary, the UKIP support base in the European Parliament elections appears to be an uneasy coalition of two very different groups. The ‘strategic’ UKIP voter is typically an affluent middle class, middle aged Conservative-leaning man, who votes instrumentally for UKIP in European Parliament elections to express his hostility to the EU but retains positive feelings towards the political mainstream, and returns to the Conservative party fold in general elections. The ‘core’ UKIP voter, by contrast, is typically a young working class man or woman who is struggling financially. His family background and traditional loyalties lie with Labour, but he is now deeply disaffected about the political establishment and alarmed about immigration. Such a profile has a lot of similarities with the profile of British National Party supporters (Cutts, Ford and Goodwin, 2010) and indeed the profile of populist radical right supporters elsewhere in Europe (for an overview see Mudde 2007).

UKIP thus has two very distinct appeals to British voters. Our evidence suggests that some voters perceive the party purely as a vehicle for registering their Euroscepticism by sending anti-Europeans to Strasbourg, while remaining loyal to the main parties, principally the Conservatives, in domestic elections. Other voters, however, perceive UKIP as an outlet for expressing a more broad-based hostility to

the political elite, coupled with anger about immigration. Such voters may be attracted by UKIP's anti-system credentials as much as its Euroscepticism. The presence of many women and younger voters among this group suggests UKIP may be benefitting from the perceived extremism of the BNP, which tends to put off these groups in particular (Ford & Goodwin 2010). UKIP core voters, indeed, are similar enough to BNP supporters to suggest that the two parties may be drawing from the same pool of voters in general elections – angry, disaffected, working class voters who are concerned about immigration and hostile to the established political parties. However, while much of this electorate continues to regard the BNP as beyond the pale, UKIP may be emerging as a 'polite alternative' – an acceptable way to express their populist disgust with the political status quo and anxiety over immigration and rising ethno-cultural diversity.

Conclusions

At the outset of the article we put forward three distinct models which might possibly account for support for the UK Independence Party (UKIP) in the context of a second order election: the socio-structural model, strategic voting and sincere voting theses. Our analysis of the background characteristics of UKIP voters finds that the popular description of these supporters as being 'angry old men' does contain an element of truth, although 'insecure old men' is a more accurate description. The UKIP vote is concentrated among men, older generations, the financially insecure and citizens who read anti-immigrant and Eurosceptic newspapers. This social profile of UKIP supporters is strikingly similar to the profile of voters of the extreme right BNP, who

have also been shown to be older males, economically pessimistic and read the same newspapers (Ford & Goodwin 2010). However, when set against their more northern and working class BNP rivals, supporters of UKIP are slightly older, more affluent and more likely to be based in the more prosperous southern regions of England. Meanwhile, UKIP voters are less common in Scotland and Wales where nationalist parties may focus populist resentment toward Westminster rather than the European Parliament, and where the EU is more likely to be seen as a valuable counterweight to English dominance.

With regard to the attitudinal drivers of this vote choice, and once we control for those socio-structural characteristics, it becomes clear that Euroscepticism is by far the most important predictor of support for UKIP. The party's strong performance in elections to the European Parliament is thus more a reflection of the strength of British Euroscepticism than evidence that UKIP has successfully mobilized concerns over other social and political issues. However, we also find evidence that other motivations are driving UKIP support. While traditional racist hostility is less important to UKIP than the BNP (Cutts, Ford & Goodwin 2010), political dissatisfaction and xenophobia remain important drivers of support for the party. Importantly, it may well be that campaign context which has been shown to have a significant effect on defection rates (Hobolt, Spoon & Tilley 2009) is similarly playing a role. As noted at the outset, the 'expenses scandal' dominated media coverage of the campaign and it is likely that this event fuelled protest sentiment or abstention.

Our data also allowed an examination of core and strategic UKIP voters, which provides strong evidence that these two types of supporter are distinct. Strategic support for UKIP is concentrated among more affluent middle class voters

who seem to view EP elections as an opportunity to register their dislike of the EU. Some suggest citizens may use second-order elections in an expressive tactical manner, whereby they use their vote ‘to warn their own party to mend its ways’ (Heath et al. 1999: 407; also van der Eijk et al. 1996). We find evidence that disillusioned Conservatives are making an expressive tactical choice to vote UKIP as a means of sending a message to their main party of choice on the issue of Europe. ‘Core’ UKIP support are by contrast a more economically marginal and politically disaffected group, who may be attracted to UKIP by its populist rejection of ‘politics as usual’ and by its anti-immigration and anti-Muslim policies.

What are the implications of our analysis for UKIP and the wider arena of minor party politics? In terms of intra-party politics, our evidence reveals an uneasy coalition which consists of, on one side, highly disaffected and more intolerant core supporters who are driven by sincere concerns and, on the other, principally Eurosceptic and disillusioned Conservative voters who are driven more by strategic considerations. The more strident Euroscepticism expressed by the Conservatives under David Cameron, who has withdrawn his party from the main (and pro-integration) European People’s Party, appointed the strongly Eurosceptic William Hague as foreign secretary, and fielded the most Eurosceptic slate of Westminster candidates in recent history, suggest the Conservatives have recognized the discontent of these strategic voters and is attempting to win them back. If this is so, it suggests that strategic voting in second order elections can indeed succeed in ‘sending a message’ to mainstream parties and deliver a change in policy stance. Whether the changes made by Cameron will be sufficient to satisfy UKIP defectors remains to be seen, but it must certainly be true that UKIP will find it harder to mobilize hostility to Europe under a Conservative government dominated by figures who are hostile to

further European integration than it did in the past thirteen years of a Labour government which was broadly sympathetic to the EU.

However, the analysis here suggests that UKIP are likely to retain a core base of loyalists who are too deeply disaffected with mainstream politics to be won over by shifts in policy or changes of the guard at Westminster. Many of these voters are also angry about immigration and anxious about Islam, and the more recent shift by UKIP towards these issues suggests they are aware that campaigning on this front could help them win a more stable and enduring coalition of voters. In particular, UKIP is well positioned to recruit support from the BNP which, following a disappointing performance in the general election in 2010, has become embroiled by infighting that stems from allegations of financial mismanagement and political incompetence. In this way, UKIP may well 'act as a bridge to the supporters of the main parties who identify with the policies of the BNP but who do not wish to do so directly' (John & Margetts 2009: 508)

Immigration has become a highly salient issue in recent years, more so than Europe. For example, at the time of the general election in 1997 30 per cent of respondents in one regular poll considered Europe an important issue compared to just 3 per cent who considered race, immigration and asylum important. By the time of the general election in 2010, these figures had almost reversed: only 6 per cent of respondents considered Europe important compared with 38 per cent who selected considered race, asylum and immigration.¹³ In contrast to the stigmatized brand of the extreme right, UKIP holds its roots in a Eurosceptic tradition and hence possesses a 'reputational shield' which could be used to rebut accusations of extremism and racism (Ivarsflaten, 2006). Unlike the stigmatized BNP, UKIP is not regarded as an outlet for extremism or racism and is therefore accepted as a legitimate political

option, even when it mobilizes on these issues. However, if UKIP chooses to focus on these issues it may alienate many of its strategic supporters, who are primarily motivated to defect from the Conservatives by their Euroscepticism. UKIP may therefore face a difficult trade-off: while its greatest political successes have come by mobilizing Euroscepticism among mainstream Conservative voters in European Parliament elections, its best prospect for developing a lasting and stable electoral presence under a Eurosceptic Conservative government may be to focus instead on the angry, alienated, anti-immigrant voters who have been mobilized with great success elsewhere in Europe by the radical right, and who currently form the core of the party's support in domestic elections.

**Table 1: Support for UKIP in House of Commons and European Parliament
(EP) Elections**

Election year	Votes received (% of vote)	Constituencies contested	Avg in seats contested
<i>House of Commons</i>			
1997	103,817 (0.3)	183	567
2001	375,122 (1.5)	393	955
2005	605,973 (2.2)	496	1,222
2010	920,334 (3.1)	572	1,609
<i>European Parliament</i>			
	Votes received	Seats won	Best region (%)
1994	150,251 (1.0)	0	
1999	696,057 (7.0)	3	South West (10.6)
2004	2,650,768 (16.1)	12	East Midlands (26.1)
2009	2,498,226 (16.5)	13	South West (22.1)

Table 2: Social background of party supporters and non-voters in the 2009 European Parliament elections

	UKIP	BNP	Cons	Lab	LD	Non-Voters	Full sample
Gender							
Male	55	61	45	53	48	46	48
Age							
18-29	10	17	22	22	23	30	21
30-44	20	30	27	25	26	28	26
45-59	35	31	28	31	28	28	30
60 plus	36	22	24	23	23	15	23
Region*							
North of England	23	32	19	32	24	27	24
Midlands	20	22	17	16	16	17	16
South of England	39	27	38	23	34	31	33
London	10	12	16	12	12	11	13
Wales	4	4	4	6	5	6	5
Scotland	3	4	4	11	7	9	9
Social Class							
Professional/Managerial	35	23	42	36	42	28	37
Routine Non-Manual	26	25	28	28	30	30	28
Skilled Manual	17	23	10	12	9	12	11
Semi/Unskilled/Never worked	12	20	9	14	10	18	12
Other	11	11	11	10	10	13	11
Political Background							
Parental Socialisation (Conservative)	32	25	47	11	23	21	27
Parental Socialisation (Labour)	42	47	25	66	38	41	41
Read Anti-Immigrant Papers	49	49	51	22	26	38	36
Economic Expectations							
Fear of losing job in next 12 months	45	49	42	36	38	42	40
Not enough money to live comfortably	59	74	50	42	47	57	52
Resp Finances worsen in next 12 mths	55	53	42	28	37	42	41
<hr/>							
<i>N (unweighted)</i>	4306	985	6176	4546	4289	3099	

All figures are percentages. Bold figures are significantly different from the overall sample mean ($p < 0.05$).

*North of England: North East, North West and Yorkshire and Humberside; Midlands: West Midlands and East Midlands;

South of England: Eastern, South East, South West

Table 3 Attitudes of party supporters and non-voters in the 2009 European Parliament Elections

% agree or strongly agree	UKIP	BNP	Cons	Lab	LD	Non-Voters	Full sample
<i>Eurocepticism</i>							
EU promotes prosperity in Europe*	73	61	45	17	20	33	37
Britain should leave the EU	82	70	44	19	21	38	39
<i>Populism</i>							
Most Politicians are personally corrupt	67	78	50	36	47	64	54
Don't trust local MP to tell the truth**	73	81	60	48	60	71	63
No difference between the main parties	60	69	24	30	45	62	46
<i>Xenophobia</i>							
Govt should encourage imms to leave Britain	43	72	31	19	16	27	27
Immigration not helped economy ⁺⁺	72	82	56	32	32	49	48
Further immigration to the UK should be halted	87	94	68	46	43	65	61
Councils allow imms to jump housing queue	77	87	64	43	43	59	57
Immigrants responsible for most crime	32	57	19	12	10	21	19
<i>Disaffection about the main parties</i>							
Cons never cared about people like me	29	43	2	70	46	36	36
Cons no longer care about people like me	16	17	3	7	8	10	8
Lab never cared about people like me	35	31	42	1	16	21	23
Lab no longer care about people like me	54	54	46	19	54	42	45
<i>Racism</i>							
Employers should favour white applicants	22	49	15	12	8	16	15
Black people less intelligent ⁺⁺⁺	17	30	17	11	9	15	13
Non-white citizens not as British	18	44	13	8	7	14	12
<i>Islamophobia</i>							
Islam a serious danger to Western civilization	64	79	49	37	31	44	44
<i>Homophobia</i>							
Oppose civil partnerships for gay couples	41	43	28	18	15	21	24

N 4306 985 6176 4546 4289 3099

Bold figures are significantly different from overall sample mean

*% Disagree or strongly disagree

**% saying "do not trust much" or "do not trust at all"

+ % disagreeing or strongly disagreeing with the statement "Britain has benefitted in recent decades from the arrival in recent decades of people from many different countries and cultures"

++% disagreeing or strongly disagreeing with the statement "Immigration has helped Britain's economy grow faster than it would have done"

+++ % disagreeing or strongly disagreeing with the statement "There is no difference in intelligence between the average black Briton and the average white Briton"

Sample size of all voters = 29169. All figures are percentages.

Table 4 Models of UKIP support

	<i>Model 1: Social background</i>	<i>Model 2: Eurocepticism</i>	<i>Model 3: All attitudes</i>	<i>Model 4: Racism added</i>
Intercept	-4.68 (0.26)	-3.67 (0.28)	-3.94(0.31)	-3.94 (0.31)
Male	0.50 (0.07)	0.27 (0.18)	0.41(0.05)	0.42 (0.05)
Age	0.05 (0.01)	0.02 (0.01)	0.02(0.01)	0.01 (0.01)
Age squared/1000	-0.21 (0.10)	-0.07 (0.10)	0.005 (0.11)	0.001 (0.11)
Region (ref: North of England)				
Midlands	0.19 (0.06)	0.20 (0.07)	0.20(0.07)	0.20 (0.07)
South of England	0.19 (0.05)	0.18 (0.06)	0.20(0.06)	0.19 (0.06)
London	-0.15 (0.07)	-0.11 (0.08)	-0.10(0.08)	-0.09 (0.08)
Wales	-0.28 (0.11)	-0.22 (0.12)	-0.20(0.12)	-0.22 (0.12)
Scotland	-1.12 (0.10)	-1.02 (0.11)	-0.99(0.11)	-0.99 (0.11)
Social Class (ref: Prof/Man)				
Routine Non-Manual	0.06 (0.05)	-0.06 (0.06)	-0.03(0.06)	-0.03 (0.06)
Skilled Manual	0.30 (0.07)	-0.02 (0.07)	-0.06(0.07)	-0.06 (0.07)
Semi/Unskilled/Never worked	0.10 (0.07)	-0.17 (0.08)	-0.19(0.09)	-0.18 (0.09)
Other	0.10 (0.07)	-0.08 (0.07)	-0.07(0.08)	-0.07 (0.07)
Political Background				
Parental Socialisation (Conservative)	0.17 (0.05)	0.07 (0.06)	0.01(0.06)	0.02 (0.06)
Parental Socialisation (Labour)	-0.005 (0.05)	-0.04 (0.06)	-0.05(0.06)	-0.06 (0.06)
Read Anti-Immigrant Papers	0.55 (0.04)	0.16 (0.05)	0.09(0.05)	0.09 (0.05)
Economic Expectations				
Fear losing job in next 12 months	0.08 (0.04)	0.06 (0.05)	0.01(0.05)	0.01 (0.05)
Can't live comfortably	0.17 (0.04)	-0.11 (0.05)	-0.17(0.05)	-0.17 (0.05)
Finances worsen in next 12 mths	0.37 (0.04)	0.20 (0.05)	0.15(0.05)	0.15 (0.05)
Attitude scales				
Eurocepticism		1.23 (0.03)	1.10(0.04)	1.09 (0.03)
Xenophobia			0.10 (0.04)	0.16 (0.04)
Populism			0.13(0.03)	0.12 (0.03)
Racism				-0.10 (0.03)
Disaffection about main parties				
Cons never cared			-0.003(0.06)	-0.007 (0.06)
Cons no longer care			0.48(0.07)	0.49 (0.07)
Lab never cared			0.58(0.08)	0.58 (0.08)
Lab no longer care			0.67(0.08)	0.66 (0.08)
Additional attitudes				
Islam a threat			-0.02(0.02)	-0.03 (0.02)
Oppose civil partnerships			0.02(0.02)	0.03 (0.02)
Jewish/Communist conspiracy			-0.25(0.06)	-0.22 (0.06)
<hr/>				
<i>Model fit (F statistic)</i>	64.8	143.7	107.9	104.0
<i>N</i>	32268	31595	30482	30482

Figures in bold are statistically significant (p<0.05)

Table 5 Models of Core vs Strategic UKIP support

	<i>Model 1: Social background</i>	<i>Model 2: Euro scepticism</i>	<i>Model 3: All attitudes</i>
Intercept	0.26(0.47)	0.39(0.48)	0.71(0.57)
Male	-0.28(0.31)	-0.28(0.32)	-0.35(0.09)
Age	-0.03(0.02)	-0.04(0.02)	-0.05(0.02)
Age squared/1000	0.24(0.18)	0.30(0.18)	0.47(0.20)
<i>Region (ref: North of England)</i>			
Midlands	0.09(0.11)	-0.08(0.12)	-0.05(0.12)
South of England	0.002(0.09)	-0.01(0.09)	0.11(0.10)
London	-0.44(0.14)	-0.44(0.14)	-0.28(0.15)
Wales	0.50(0.20)	0.50(0.20)	0.53(0.20)
Scotland	-0.39(0.21)	-0.39(0.21)	-0.41(0.22)
<i>Social Class (ref: Prof/Man)</i>			
Routine Non-Manual	0.21(0.10)	0.21(0.10)	0.08(0.10)
Skilled Manual	0.55(0.11)	0.54(0.11)	0.35(0.12)
Semi/Unskilled/Never worked	0.62(0.13)	0.61(0.13)	0.31(0.14)
Other	0.37(0.12)	0.37(0.12)	0.31(0.13)
<i>Political Background</i>			
Parental Socialisation (Conservative)	0.09(0.09)	0.08(0.10)	0.18(0.10)
Parental Socialisation (Labour)	0.47(0.09)	0.47(0.09)	0.32(0.10)
Read Anti-Immigrant Papers	-0.19(0.07)	-0.19(0.07)	-0.12(0.08)
<i>Economic Expectations</i>			
Fear losing job in next 12 months	0.01(0.08)	0.01(0.08)	-0.05(0.08)
Can't live comfortably	0.38(0.08)	0.38(0.08)	0.23(0.09)
Finances worsen in next 12 mths	-0.01(0.08)	-0.03(0.08)	-0.11(0.09)
<i>Attitude scales</i>			
Euro scepticism		0.11(0.05)	0.03(0.03)
Xenophobia			0.17(0.07)
Populism			0.48(0.05)
<i>Disaffection about main parties</i>			
Cons never cared			0.61(0.09)
Cons no longer care			0.62(0.11)
Lab never cared			-0.46(0.15)
Lab no longer care			-0.10(0.14)
<i>Additional attitudes</i>			
Islam a threat			-0.04(0.04)
Oppose civil partnerships			-0.02(0.03)
Jewish/Communist conspiracy			0.15(0.10)
<hr/>			
<i>Model fit (f-statistic)</i>	8.1	8.2	13.3
<i>N</i>	4601	4577	4467

Figures in bold are statistically significant (p<0.05)

Figure 1: Estimated impact of different predictors on UKIP support




Figure 1 shows impact of a change from 1 standard deviation below the mean score on each of the four attitudinal factors (Euroscepticism, Xenophobia, Protest, Racism) to one standard deviation about the mean, and of changes from a zero to a 1 score on the dummy variables. The region effect shows the difference between the lowest support region (Scotland) and the highest support region (the Midlands). Other predictors are held at their means.

Appendix

Table A 1: Question wordings for attitude factor questions

Xenophobia

All further immigration to the UK should be halted
Local councils normally allow immigrant families to jump the queue in allocating council homes
Immigration in recent years has helped Britain's economy grow faster than it would have done
Most crimes in Britain are committed by immigrants
The Government should encourage immigrants and their families to leave Britain (including family members who were born in the UK)

Populism

Most British politicians are personally corrupt
How much do you trust each of the following to tell the truth? Your local MP*
There is no real difference these days between Britain's three main parties

Racism

When employers recruit new workers, they should favour white applicants over non-white applicants
There is no difference in intelligence between the average black Briton and the average white Briton
Non-white British citizens who were born in this country are just as 'British' as white citizens born in this country

Euro scepticism

The existence of the EU promotes prosperity throughout Europe
The UK should withdraw completely from the European Union

Table A 2: Factor loadings for attitude factors, confirmatory factor analysis

	<i>Loading on factor</i>
<i>Xenophobia</i>	
Factor eigenvalue: 3.30 (66% of variance explained)	
Immigration should be halted	0.88
Immigrants jump queue for council housing	0.74
Immigration is good for the economy (R)	0.80
Immigrants commit most crime	0.80
Govt should encourage immigrants to leave Britain	0.83
<i>Populism</i>	
Factor eigenvalue: 1.60 (53% of variance explained)	
Most Politicians are personally corrupt	0.80
Don't trust local MP to tell the truth	0.75
No difference between the main parties	0.63
<i>Racism</i>	
Factor eigenvalue: 1.90 (63% of variance explained)	
Employers should favour white applicants	0.80
Black people less intelligent	0.77
Non-white citizens not as British	0.82
<i>Euroscepticism</i>	
Factor eigenvalue: 1.73 (86% of variance explained)	
EU promotes prosperity in Europe	0.93
Britain should leave the EU	0.93
Pw correlation between two Euroscepticism items	0.73

Note: (R) indicates reverse coding

Table A 3: Pairwise correlations between the factors

	Xenophobia	Racism	Populism	Euroscepticism
Xenophobia	*			
Racism	0.65	*		
Populism	0.39	0.20	*	
Euroscepticism	0.54	0.42	0.33	*

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¹ For a more journalistic account of UKIP see M. Daniel (2005) *Cranks and gadflies: the story of UKIP*. Timewell Press.

² Indeed there is no question that activists in the BNP consider UKIP their chief rival for electoral support (Copsey 2008: 153-4).

³ The slogan 'sod the lot' (of mainstream politicians) featured prominently on UK Independence Party (UKIP) election billboards during the European Parliament elections campaign.

⁴ M. Kite (2009) 'UKIP hopes to climb out of the wilderness', *Daily Telegraph* 30 May 2009. Available online: <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/eu/5412129/Ukip-hopes-to-climb-out-of-the-wilderness.html> (accessed December 2 2009); 'Farage: UKIP not just angry men', BBC News May 10 2009. Available online: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics/8042747.stm (accessed December 2 2009).

⁵ YouGov draws a sub-sample of the panel that is representative of the UK electorate by age, gender, social class and type of newspaper. Only this sub-sample has access to the questionnaire. Respondents can only answer this questionnaire once.

⁶ To obtain voting intention all respondents were asked: 'if you do vote, which party do you intend to vote for in the election to the European Parliament?' 4306 (14.8%) respondents stated they would vote UKIP in the unweighted sample. This is close to the vote share of 16.5% that UKIP achieved in the election.

⁷ Details of the factor analysis are presented in Appendix 1.

⁸ The imputation process was carried out using the "mi" suite of commands in Stata 11.

⁹ More standard measures of model fit such as pseudo-R square cannot be straightforwardly computed for multiply imputed models, but in standard logistic models run by the authors using listwise deletion of missing data, the model fit improved dramatically when the Euroscepticism factor was included.

¹⁰ The simulations estimate effects for a man from London with all other variables set at their means or at zero.

¹¹ The Westminster preferences of the remaining 23% broke down as follows: 4% said they would vote Labour, 5.5% claimed they would vote Lib Dem, with 3% stating they would vote for other fringe parties, including the Greens and BNP. More than 10% said they wouldn't or didn't know whether they would vote.

¹² There is also a smaller group of 295 voters who did not vote UKIP in the European Parliament elections but intended to support the party in the Westminster elections. This pattern of behaviour is more consistent with "core" UKIP support as it involves backing the party in elections it has no chance of winning. These individuals are therefore included in the "core" UKIP support base. Excluding them from the model does not significantly affect the findings

¹³ Figures taken from the Ipsos-MORI Issues Index and refer to polling data in the months May 1997 and May 2010. Available online: <http://www.ipsos-mori.com/> (accessed June 10 2010).